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Social Interactions and Labor Market Outcomes in Cities
*
 
We develop a model where information about jobs is essentially obtained through friends and 
relatives, i.e. strong and weak ties. Workers commute to a business center to work and to 
interact with other people. We find that housing prices increase with the level of social 
interactions in the city because information about jobs is transmitted more rapidly and, as a 
result, individuals are more likely to be employed and to be able to pay higher land rents. We 
also show that, under some condition, workers using more their weak ties than strong ties to 
find a job receive a higher wage. We finally demonstrate that workers living far away from 
jobs pay lower housing prices but experience higher unemployment rates than those living 
close to jobs because they mainly rely on their strong ties to obtain information about jobs. 
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* I am grateful to Joan de Marti for helpful comments. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Social interactions are a key aspect of everyday’s life. People interact with each other to exert
social activities, exchange information about jobs, etc. These interactions, in particular in
the labor market, tend to be localized. For instance, using Census Tract data for Chicago in
1980 and 1990, Topa (2001) ﬁnds a signiﬁcantly positive amount of social interactions across
neighboring tracts, especially for areas with a high proportion of less educated workers
and/or minorities. Bayer et al. (2005) also document that people who live close to each
other, deﬁned as being in the same census block, tend to work together, that is, in the same
census block. We do not have however a clear understanding of the mechanisms at work.
How local interactions in the labor market inﬂuence wages, employment, and land rents?
How localized are these social interactions? What is the impact of commuting costs on
social interactions? The aim of this paper is to provide some answers to these questions by
developing a model where social interactions, labor and land market aspects are all explicitly
taken into account.
In his seminal papers, Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1983) deﬁnes a strong tie as a social
relationship between two agents that is repe a t e do v e rt i m e( f o re x a m p l em e m b e r so ft h e
same family or very close friends) and as weak tie a transitory social encounter between two
persons. Granovetter argued that weak ties are superior to strong ties for providing support
in getting a job because they involve a secondary ring of acquaintances who have contacts
with networks outside ego’s network and therefore oﬀer new sources of information on job
opportunities. Based on Granovetter’s approach ,w em o d e ls o c i a li n t e r a c t i o n si nt h el a b o r
market by the use of weak and strong ties.
There is a growing interest in theoretical models of peer eﬀects (see e.g. Akerlof, 1997;
G l a e s e re ta l . ,1 9 9 6 ;B a l l e s t e re ta l . ,2 0 0 6 ) , especially in the labor market. However, few
models of social networks in the labor market are dynamic. Montgomery (1994) and Calv´ o-
Armengol et al. (2007) propose a dynamic model of weak and strong ties but the former
focuses on inequality while the latter on the interaction between crime and labor markets.
Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004) have a more general network analysis (since they can
encompass any network structure) but do not model the urban space. To the best of our
knowledge, there are nearly no theoretical papers in which social interactions in the labor
m a r k e ta r ee m b e d d e di na nu r b a ns p a c e .A ne x ception is Selod and Zenou (2006) but there
is no explicit analysis of the social network.
To be more precise, we consider a dynamic model of the labor market in which dyad
members do not change over time so that two individuals belonging to the same dyad hold a
2strong tie with each other. However, each dyad partner can meet other individuals outside
the dyad partnership, referred to as weak ties or random encounters. By deﬁnition, weak
ties are transitory and only last for one period. The process through which individuals learn
about jobs results from a combination of a socialization process that takes place inside the
family (in the case of strong ties) and a socialization process outside the family (in the case
of weak ties). Bisin and Verdier (2000) refer to the former as vertical socialization and to the
latter as oblique socialization. Thus, information about jobs is essentially obtained through
friends and relative, i.e. strong and weak ties. Workers commute to a business center to
w o r ka n dt oi n t e r a c tw i t ho t h e rp e o p l e .W eﬁnd that housing prices increase with the level
of social interactions in the city because information about jobs is transmitted more rapidly
and, as a result, individuals are more likely to be employed and to be able to pay higher
land rents. We also show that, under some condition, workers using more their weak ties
than strong ties to ﬁnd a job receive a higher wage.
We then extend this framework by assuming that interactions with weak ties can only
take place in the business district since as pointed out by Sigelman et al. (1996) most
superﬁcial encounters occur while shopping, going to bars, and the like. Land rents now
compensate both for commuting time and social interactions. We ﬁnd that workers living
far away from jobs pay lower housing prices but experience higher unemployment rates than
those living close to jobs because they mainly rely on their strong ties to obtain information
about jobs.
We ﬁnally endogeneize the level of social interactions chosen by individuals. We ﬁnd that,
even though workers want to interact with weak ties because it increases their probability to
be employed, workers residing closer to jobs interact more with weak ties than those residing
further away from jobs. This is because the marginal gain of interacting with weak ties is
higher for workers residing closer to jobs than for those locating further away because of
higher pecuniary and time commuting costs.
It has to be emphasized that it is very diﬃcult to combine an explicit network analysis
with a ﬁnite number of individuals (Vega-Redondo, 2007; Goyal, 2007; Jackson, 2008) with
the monocentric city model where a continuum of individuals is considered (Fujita, 1989;
Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Our model can be seen a ﬁrst step towards this direction. One the
one hand, the network is extremely simpliﬁe ds i n c ew eo n l yc o n s i d e rdyads, i.e., individuals
belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups. On the other, because of dyads, we can
develop a dynamic model, an essential feature of labor markets.1
1There are some recent papers that combine social interactions and urban spatial structure (Helsley and
Strange, 2007; Brueckner and Lagey, 2008). However, in all these papers, the social network is not explicitly
32T h e m o d e l
Consider a population of individuals of size one.
Dyads We assume that individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, re-
ferred to as dyads. We say that two individuals belonging to the same dyad hold a strong
tie with each other. We assume that dyad members do not change over time. A strong tie
is created once and for ever, and can never be broken. We can thus think of strong ties as
links between members of the same family, or between very close friends.
Individuals can be in either of two diﬀerent states: employed or unemployed. Dyads,
which consist of paired individuals, can thus be in three diﬀerent states,2 which are the
following:
(i)b o t hm e m b e r sa r ee m p l o y e d−we denote by d2 the number of such dyads;
(ii) one member is employed and the other is unemployed (d1);
(iii)b o t hm e m b e r sa r eu n e m p l o y e d( d0).
Aggregate state Denoting by e(t)a n du(t) respectively the employment rate and the





The population normalization condition can then be written as






modelled. Social interactions are captured by externalities and only average eﬀects are considered.
2The inner ordering of dyad members does not matter.
4Social interactions Time is continuous and individuals live for ever.
We assume that repeated random pairwise meetings through time. Matching can take
place between dyad partners or not. At time t, each individual can meet a weak tie with
probability ω(t)( t h u s1− ω(t) is the probability of meeting his strong-tie partner at time
t).3 Throughout the paper, we assume that these probabilities are constant and do not vary
over time, and thus can be written as ω and 1−ω. We will endogeneize ω in section 6 below.
Observe that we here assume that strong ties and weak ties are substitutes, i.e. the more
one spends time with weak ties, the less he has time to spend with strong ties.
We refer to matchings inside the dyad partnership as strong ties, and to matchings
outside the dyad partnership as weak ties or random encounters. Within each matched pair,
information is exchanged, as explained below. Observe that we assume symmetry within
each dyad, that is if I meet a strong (or a weak) tie, then my strong (or weak) tie has to
meet me. In the language of graph theory, this means that the network of relationships is
undirected (see, for example, Jackson, 2008).
Information transmission Employed workers hear of job vacancies at exogenous rate λ
while they lose their job at exogenous rate δ. All jobs and all workers are identical (unskilled
labor) and all employed workers obtain the same wage. So, employed workers, who hear
about a job, pass this information on to their current matched partner (i.e. strong and weak
ties). Thus, information about jobs is essentially obtained through friends and relative.
This information transmission protocol deﬁnes a Markov process. The state variable is
the relative size of each type of dyad. Transitions depend on the labor market turnover, and
on the nature of social interactions as captured by ω.
Because of the Markov/Poisson process, during a small interval of time t and t + dt,
the probability of a two-state change is zero (small order). This means, in particular, that
both members of a dyad cannot change their status at the same time. For example, two
unemployed workers cannot at the same time ﬁnd a job, i.e. during t and t + dt,t h e
probability assigned to a transition from a d0−dyad to a d2−dyad is zero. Similarly, two
employed workers (d2−dyad) cannot become both unemployed, i.e. switch to a d0−dyad
during t and t + dt.
This applies to all the other dyads mentioned above.
3If each individual has one unit of time to spend with his friends, then ω(t) can also be interpreted as
t h ep e r c e n t a g eo ft i m es p e n tw i t hw e a kt i e s .
5Flows of dyads between states It is readily checked that the net ﬂow of dyads from











where h(e(t)) ≡ [1 − ω + ωe (t)]λ and g(e(t)) ≡ ωe (t)λ.
Let us explain in details these equation. Take the ﬁrst one. Then, the variation of dyads
composed of two employed workers (
•
d2(t)) is equal to the number of d1−dyads in which the
unemployed worker has found a job (through either his strong tie with probability (1−ω)λ
or his weak tie with probability ωe(t)λ) minus the number of d2−dyads in which one the two
employed workers has lost his job. In the second equation, the variation of dyads composed
of one employed and one unemployed worker (
•
d1(t)) is equal to the number of d0−dyads
in which one of the unemployed workers has found a job (only through his weak tie with
probability g(e(t)) since his strong tie is unemployed and cannot therefore transmit any job
information) minus the number of d1−dyads in which either the employed worker has lost
his job (with probability δ) or the unemployed worker has found a job with the help of
his strong or weak tie (with probability h(e(t))) minus the number of d2−dyads in which
one the two employed has lost his job. Finally, in the last equation, the variation of dyads
composed of two unemployed workers (
•
d0(t)) is equal to the number of d1−dyads in which
the employed worker has lost his job minus the number of d0−dyads in which one of the
unemployed workers has found a job (only through his strong tie, with probability g(e(t)))
These dynamic equations reﬂect the ﬂows across dyads. Graphically,
1 d 0 d 2 d
δ δ 2
λ ωe 2 () λ ω ω e + − 1
Figure 1: Flows in the labor market
Observe that the assumption stated above that both members of a dyad cannot lose their
status at the same time is reﬂe c t e di nt h eﬂows described by (4). What is crucial in our
analysis is that members of the same dyad (strong ties) always stay together throughout
their life. So, for example, if a d2−dyad becomes a d0−dyad, the members of this dyad are
exactly the same; they have just changed their employment status.
6Taking into account (3), the system (4) reduces to a two-dimensional dynamic system in







d1(t)=2 g(e(t))(1/2 − d2(t) − d1(t)) − [δ + h(e(t))]d1(t)+2 δd2(t)
where, using (1):
e(t)=2 d2(t)+d1(t)
3 Steady-state equilibrium analysis
A steady-state equilibrium requires solving simultaneously two problems:
(i) (steady state) labor ﬂows (referred to as a labor market equilibrium);
(ii) a location and rental price outcome (referred to as an urban land use equilibrium)
For convenience, we expose ﬁrst the steady-state labor market equilibrium and then the
urban land use equilibrium.
3.1 Labor market equilibrium
At a steady-state (d∗
2,d ∗
1,d ∗
0), each of the net ﬂow in (4) is equal to zero. Setting these net





































Deﬁnition 1 A steady-state labor market equilibrium is a four-tuple (d∗
2,d ∗
1,d ∗
0,e ∗,u ∗)s u c h
that equations (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are satisﬁed.
7Deﬁne Z =( 1− ω)/ω, B = δ/(λω). We have the following result.
Proposition 1
(i) There always exists a steady-state equilibrium U where all individuals are unemployed
and only d0−dyads exist, that is d∗
2 = d∗
1 = e∗ =0 , d∗
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− B − Z>0, (11)
0 <u ∗ < 1 by (9), and 0 <d ∗
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If condition (10) holds, then an interior equilibrium always exists. Indeed, the job-
destruction rate δ has to be not too large and the job-contact rate λ high enough for the
interior equilibrium. Otherwise, all workers will be unemployed and the steady-state equi-
librium U will prevail. The latter is obviously uninteresting and, from now on, we only focus
on the labor market equilibrium I.
3.2 Urban land-use equilibrium
Consider a continuum of equally productive workers uniformly distributed along a linear and
closed city. All land is owned by absentee landlords and all ﬁrms are exogenously located in
the Business District (BD hereafter). The BD is a unique employment center located at one
end of the linear city. In a centralized city, it corresponds to the Central Business District,
8whereas in a completely decentralized city, it represents suburban employment. Workers are
risk neutral, optimally decide their place of residence between the BD and the other end of
the city, and all consume the same amount of land (normalized to 1 for simplicity). Without
loss of generality, the density of residential land parcels is taken to be unity, so that there
are exactly x units of housing within a distance x from the BD. As stated above, the total
population is normalized to 1.
Each individual is identiﬁed with one unit of labor. Each employed worker goes to the
BD to work and incurs a ﬁxed monetary commuting cost τ per unit of distance. When living
at a distance x from the BD, he also pays a land rent R(x), consumes 1 unit of land and
zL unities of the non-spatial composite good (which is taken as the numeraire so that its
price is normalized to 1) and earns a wage y. The wage is assumed to be exogenous.4 For
example, one could think of a minimum wage that is exogenously ﬁxed by the government.
The instantaneous (indirect) utility of an employed worker located at a distance x from the
BD is equal to:
V1(x)=y − τx− R(x)( 1 5 )
Concerning the unemployed workers, they commute less often to the BD since they
essentially go there for interacting with other people (see section 6 for an explicit modelling
of this issue). So, we assume that the unemployed workers incur a commuting cost sτperunit
of distance, where 0 <s≤ 1. For example s = 1 would mean that the unemployed workers
go everyday to the BD (as often as the employed workers) whereas, if s =1 /2, then the
unemployed make only half as many BD-trips as the employed workers. The instantaneous
(indirect) utility of an unemployed worker residing at a distance x from the BD is therefore
equal to:
V0(x)=b − sτx− R(x)( 1 6 )
where b<yis the unemployment beneﬁt. We assume that b is exogenously ﬁnanced by
taxpayers who reside elsewhere (for example absentee landlords).
We are now able to calculate the expected utility of each worker. To do that, as in
Zenou (2006a), we assume perfect capital markets with a zero interest rate.5 With perfect
4This wage will be endogeneized in section 5 below.
5When there is a zero interest rate, workers have no int r i n s i cp r e f e r e n c ef o rt h ep r e s e n ts ot h a tt h e yo n l y
care about the fraction of time they spend employed and unemployed. Therefore, the expected utilities are
not state dependent.
9capital markets, workers are able to smooth their disposable income over time so that at any
moment in time, the disposable income of a worker is equal to his average net income over




Indeed, over his lifetime, in steady-state, each employed worker spends e∗(ω)=d∗
1 +2 d∗
2 of
his time employed and 1 − e∗(ω)=2 d∗
0 + d∗
1 of his time unemployed. Since there is zero
interest rate, people only care about the time they spend in each dyad. Using (15) and (16),
this expected utility can be written as:
EV(x)=e
∗(ω)(y − τx)+[ 1− e
∗(ω)](b − sτx) − R(x)( 1 7 )
where e∗(ω) is given by (11). Observe that, in order to write this expected utility, we
have implicitly assumed that, because workers are able to smooth their income over time,
a worker’s residential location remains ﬁxed as he enters and leaves unemployment. This is
indeed more realistic than assuming that changes in employment status involve changes in
residential location. So, here, relocation costs are so high that workers always stay at the
same location and are not aﬀected by the change of their status.
Let us now solve the urban land use equilibrium. The timing is as follows. Assume
that there is an initial situation when workers pick locations without knowing their initial
employment status. They will not change location afterwards. Then, given zero discounting
and income smoothing, people bid for rents given that they anticipate the time they will
spend in each employment state. Thus, the whole structure of the analysis is: (i)i n i t i a l
period location determination; (ii) ensuing labor market shocks resulting in unemployment,
wage, etc... In equilibrium, because of the competition in the land/housing market, all ex
ante identical workers will obtain the same expected utility EV. It should be clear that
the presence of high-relocation costs means that there is no bidding after initial location
decisions.
We now need to calculate the bid rent of workers Ψ(x,EV), which is deﬁned as the
maximum land rent that a worker is willing to pay at a given location x so as to reach a
given level of utility EV.B ys o l v i n g( 1 7 )i nR(x)=Ψ(x,EV) for the utility level EV,w e
easily obtain the following linear bid rent function:
Ψ(x,EV)=e
∗(ω)(y − τx)+[ 1− e







10Indeed, in this model, bid rents compensate workers for their expected commuting costs.
Those who live close to jobs pay higher land rents because they have lower pecuniary costs
whether they are employed or not while those who live far away from jobs have the reverse.
By normalizing the agricultural land to zero and by noticing that the size of the city is equal
to 1, we have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 An urban land-use equilibrium is a couple (EV
∗
,R ∗(x)) such that:
Ψ(1,EV
∗









The ﬁrst equation guarantees that the land rent is continuous everywhere in the city
while the second equation is such that absentee landlords allocate land to the highest bidder.
Solving (18) and (19) gives:




∗(ω)(y − τ)+[ 1− e
∗(ω)](b − sτ)( 2 0 )




∗(ω)]s}τ (1 − x)( 2 1 )
We can deﬁne the general equilibrium where both the steady-state interior labor and
urban land-use equilibria are solved for simultaneously. Ignoring the equilibrium U,w eh a v e
the following result:
Proposition 3 If (10) holds, then there exists an interior steady-state equilibrium where the





,R ∗(x)) are respectively determined by (9), (11),
(12), (13), (14), (20) and (21).
4S o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s
The most interesting results of this model is the impact of social interactions (captured by









and consider steady-state equilibrium I. Then, increasing the percentage of weak ties ω








The eﬀects of ω on d∗
1 and on d∗
2 are however ambiguous.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Here, individuals belong to mutually exclusive groups, the dyads, and weak tie interac-
tions spread information across dyads. The parameter ω measures the proportion of social
interaction that occurs outside the dyad, the inter-dyad interactions. When ω is high, the
social cohesion between employed and unemployed workers is high and thus they are in close
contact with each other. In this context, increasing ω induces more transitions from un-
employment to employment and thus u∗, the unemployment rate in the economy decreases.
This is not always true since it depends on the value of λ (job contact rate) relative to
the value of δ (the job destruction rate). A suﬃcient condition for ∂u∗
∂ω < 0i s( 2 2 ) ,w h i c h
guarantees that (10) holds (see the Appendix). Even though u∗ decreases, the eﬀect of ω on
d∗
2 and d∗
1 is ambiguous. Indeed, from Figure 1, individuals leave dyad d1 and enters dyad
d2 at rate h(e) ≡ (1 − ω + ωe)λ.N o ws i n c e
∂ [(1 − ω + ωe)λ]
∂ω




is ambiguous (since −1+e<0), the eﬀects mentioned above are also ambiguous. Now
consider the eﬀect of ω on d∗
0. This is clearly negative. Indeed, from Figure 1, one can see










then, when ω increases, there are fewer d0−dyads.
Proposition 5 Assume (22) and consider steady-state equilibrium I. Then, increasing the
percentage of weak ties ω increases both the price of land (and housing) everywhere in the
city and the utility level of all workers, i.e.
∂R∗(x)
∂ω





Indeed, when the strength of weak ties ω increases, people ﬁnd jobs more easily and thus
spend more time employed during their lifetime. As a result, there are able to bid more
for land and thus the competition in the land market becomes ﬁercer. Consequently, the
price of land and housing increases at each location in the city. Because the positive impact
of ω on employment is large enough to outweight the negative eﬀect of the land rent, the
expected utility increases with an increase in ω.T h ee ﬀect of weak ties on the land rent is
an interesting and new result. It is though simple and intuitive since it says that if there are
more social interactions in an area, then information about jobs is transmitted more rapidly
and, as a result, more people would be employed and land rents would be higher. There is
a recent paper by Fu (2005) who tests in some sense this result. Fu (2005) uses the 1990
Massachusetts census data and estimates hedonic housing model with social amenities. He
found that an increase in the percentage of new residents has signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on
property values. He concludes that this is “probably due to the strength of weak ties”. Of
course, it could also be consistent with other aspects such as, for example, gentriﬁcation.
The results of a direct empirical test of the impact of social interactions on land rents will
be very interesting and will help us to verify if the prediction of our model is correct.
5 Endogenous wages
In this section, we endogenously determine the wage y. For that, we use an eﬃciency wage
model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) where ﬁrms set wages to deter shirking. There are only
two possible eﬀort levels: either the worker shirks, exerts zero eﬀort, a =0 ,a n dc o n t r i b u t e s
to zero production, or he/she does not shirk, provides full eﬀort, a>0, and contributes to
1 unit of production.
As before, there is a stochastic process in employment status changes. However, ﬁrms
cannot perfectly monitor workers, so there is a rate at which shirking is detected, denoted
by m (i.e. monitoring rate). If a worker is caught shirking, he is automatically ﬁred. As
a result, for non-shirkers, the stochastic process is as before and described by Figure 1.
However, for shirkers, it is as in Figure 1 with one diﬀerence: δ is replaced by δ + m,s i n c e
shirkers can lose their jobs either because there is a technological shock that leads to the
destruction of the job or because the worker has been caught shirking and ﬁred. The rest of
the stochastic process is the exactly the same as in the previous section. In particular, the
way workers ﬁnd a job and transmit information within and outside the dyad is the same.
13As a result, the employment rate for non-shirkers, e∗(ω)=eNS(ω) is still given by (11), while
t h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ef o rs h i r k e r seS(ω)i sd e ﬁned by (11), where δ is replaced by δ + m.
We can now write the expected utilities. For a non shirker located at a distance x from
the BD, his expected utility is equal to:
EV
NS(x)=e
∗(ω)(y − a − τx)+[ 1− e
∗(ω)](b − sτx) − R(x)( 2 3 )








(b − sτx) − R(x)( 2 4 )
The trade oﬀ between shirking and non shirking is clear: shirkers do not provide eﬀort a
but spend more time unemployed. Let us calculate the eﬃciency wage. Firms know that
workers have a zero discount rate, so, at each x,t h e ys o l v eEV NS(x)=EV S(x). By using
(23) and (24), we easily obtain the following eﬃciency wage:
y
eff = b + a
e∗(ω)
[e∗(ω) − eS(ω)]
+( 1− s)τx (25)
Equation (25) is also referred to as the non-shirking condition. The information available to
ﬁrms about workers’ residence matters in the process of wage formation. If ﬁrms perfectly
observe the residential location of all workers, then they will set the wage (25) at each
location x.I n ﬁrms do not perfectly observe the residential location of all workers in the
city, then, to prevent shirking, they will set the highest possible wage, i.e. the one for the
worker located at the city fringe x =1 .I nt h a tc a s e ,t h ee ﬃciency wage for all workers will
be given by:
y
eff = b + a
e∗(ω)
[e∗(ω) − eS(ω)]
+( 1− s)τ (26)
This is the case we consider now,6 i.e. ﬁrms do not have perfect information on workers’
residence.7 This eﬃciency wage has the standard properties of non-spatial models (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984). Indeed, when b, a,o rδ increases, or m decreases (these are the non-
spatial eﬀects), the eﬃciency wage has to increase in order to prevent shirking. The spatial
aspect of the wage is determined by the positive relationship between (eﬃciency) wages
and commuting costs. Indeed, when someone shirks, only the gain in commuting costs is
(positively) aﬀected by x, the distance to jobs. So, the further away from the BD a worker
6The case of perfect infomation is straightforward to analyze.
7It is also the more realistic case since workers can misreport their residential address.
14resides, the higher the beneﬁt of shirking in terms of commuting costs. As a result, if ﬁrms
want to induce workers not to shirk at each x, they have to increase the wage for workers living
further away from jobs in order to exactly compensate the additional gain from shirking,
that is (1 − s)τx. In the case of imperfect information, the spatial compensation is for the
worker located at x = 1 and it is thus equal to (1 − s)τ.
What is new in the present model is the impact of social interactions ω on wages. The
term
e∗(ω)
e∗(ω)−eS(ω) captures the incentive aspect of the eﬃciency wage,8 i.e. the amount nec-
essary to prevent shirking. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), it is a function of employ-
ment (or unemployment) since unemployment acts as a worker discipline device. Denote
∆e ≡
e∗(ω)−eS(ω)
e∗(ω) > 0, i.e. the diﬀerence in employment rates between shirking and non-
shirking behaviors, then
y




Indeed, the higher the diﬀerence in employment rate between shirking and non-shirking

















as the elasticity of shirking employment with respect to weak ties. We have the following
result:
Proposition 6 Assume (22) and consider steady-state equilibrium I.T h e n
∂yeff
∂ω





When interactions with weak ties ω increase, under condition (22), whether they shirk or
not, workers are on average more employed over their lifecycle. However, if the responsiveness
of employment to ω is higher for shirkers than non-shirkers, then ﬁrms need to increase
the eﬃciency wage to deter shirking. This is an interesting result because it links social
interactions and wages. In particular, it says that, if workers use more their weak ties than
strong ties to ﬁnd a job, then they will receive higher wages if the elasticity of shirking
employment with respect to weak ties is higher than that of non shirking.
8Observe that, by deﬁnition, e∗(ω) >e S(ω).
15As in the standard eﬃciency wage model, we can close the model by modelling the
behavior of ﬁrms. Consider M identical ﬁrms (j =1 ,...,M) in the economy. All ﬁrms
produce the same composite good and sell it at a ﬁxed market price p (this good is taken as
the numeraire and its price p is set to 1). Firms only care of workers’ productivity on the
job and their main objective is to prevent shirking because it is very costly (workers produce
nothing if they shirk).9 On the contrary, each worker, whatever his location, contributes to
one unit of production if he does not shirk (which will always be true in equilibrium). The
production function of each ﬁrm j is: F(lj) and it is assumed that F(·)i st w i c ed i ﬀerentiable,
with F(0) = 0, F0(·) > 0a n dF00(·) ≤ 0, and it satisﬁes the Inada conditions, i.e. F0(0) = +∞
and F0(+∞)=0 .
Since all ﬁrms are identical, let us focus on a symmetric (steady-state) equilibrium in
which each ﬁrm employs the same number of workers. This means that each ﬁrm j hires
Lj = L = e∗(ω)/M workers, where e∗(ω) is given by (11). As a result, each ﬁrm adjusts




L∗ M − eS(ω)
+( 1− s)τ = F
0(L
∗)( 2 7 )
Because of the assumptions made on the production function, it is easy to show that there
exists a unique solution in L∗.B e c a u s eL∗ = e∗(ω)/M,a n de∗(ω)i sg i v e nb y( 1 1 ) ,M will
adjust so that L∗ = e∗(ω)/M will be always true in equilibrium.
6 Social interactions and distance to jobs
We would like now to endogeneize ω.W e ﬁrst endogeneize it by imposing a relationship
between ω and x. We will then derive this relationship endogenously by letting workers
choosing optimally ω. In this section, for simplicity, we will consider the wage y as exogenous.
Making it endogenous as in the previous section will not change any of our main results but
will make the analysis more cumbersome.
6.1 Exogenous relationship between weak ties and distance to jobs
It is clear that the relationship with strong ties are in general not costly while relationships
with weak ties, which are random encounters, involve some costs. In order to capture these
9Because ω h a sa ni m p a c to nt h ee ﬃciency wage, one could argue that ﬁrms could hire people depending
on how they ﬁnd a job. We assume that ﬁrms do not know if workers have found a job through their weak
or strong ties. As a result, when deciding wage and employment, each ﬁrm takes ω as given.
16ideas, we now assume that ω is a decreasing function of x, i.e. ω(x)w i t hω0(x) < 0.10,11 As
Glaeser (2000) put it, “social inﬂuences decay rapidly with distance”. Indeed, to interact
with strong ties (family members or best friends) there is no real cost: either they live in the
same location or one just needs to make a phone call to have a contact with a strong tie. So
basically strong ties provide information at no cost, especially no spatial costs. This is well
documented empirically. For example, Topa (2001) and, more recently, Bayer et al (2005)
found evidence of signiﬁcant social interactions operating at the block level.12 In our model,
these are interactions between strong ties since they are repeated over time.
On the contrary, having contact with weak ties, deﬁned as relationships with random
encounters that are not repeated over time, involves costs (of any kind). Here we mainly
focus on spatial costs (we could easily incorporate other costs) and we assume that weak
ties only meet in the business district, which involves (both pecuniary and time) costs of
commuting to the BD.13 For example, individuals go to a bar or play bowling or go shopping
and then may meet other people. In our dynamic model, at each period, people meet
diﬀerent weak ties. Henning and Lieberg (1996) investigate the structure of networks and
the content of ties in selected neighborhoods in Link¨ oping, Sweden. Strong ties were those
of importance to the respondent and which were characterized by regular contact. Weak ties
consisted of nodding acquaintances and conversational contacts. Henning and Lieberg found
that neighborhood where people live was relatively unimportant in weak ties relationships
for both white collar and blue-collar residents - three quarters of contacts were outside the
local area.
Thus, compared to the previous section, we assume that individuals meet their strong
ties locally without needing to commute while they need to go to the BD to meet weak ties.
In that case, Proposition 1 is exactly as before with one diﬀerence, which is that all
endogenous variables (i.e. u∗, e∗, d∗
0, d∗
1 and d∗
2) are now a function of x and not of ω (and
of course a function of all the other exogenous variables). In particular, this means that, if
10We can further assume that ω(1) = 0 and ω(0) = 1, which implies that, at the BD (x = 0), individuals
interact only with weak ties while at the city fringe (x = 1), they interact only with strong ties. This is not
necessary for our main results.
11In section 6.2 below, ω will be endogeneously chosen by individuals and we will show under which
condition ω is a negative function of x.
12See also Kan (2007) who show that social capital is very local.
13Using a diﬀerent model, Helsey and Strange (2007) model social interactions in a similar way since all
social interactions occur at a single location (the “center”) and are deﬁned as the number of visits to the
center.


















> 0( 2 9 )
Indeed, for individuals living far away from jobs, it is more costly to travel to the BD and thus
are less likely to meet weak ties who can provide information about jobs. So, for example, if
someone is unemployed and belongs to a d0−dyad, then the only persons who can provide
information about jobs are weak ties. But if this person lives far away from the BD, he will
go less often there and thus will have little information about jobs.
In that case, this expected utility can be written as:
EV(x)=e
∗(x)(y − τx)+[ 1− e
∗(x)](b − sτx) − R(x)( 3 0 )
and thus the bid rent function is given by:
Ψ(x,EV)=e
∗(x)(y − τx)+[ 1− e
∗(x)](b − sτx) − EV (31)






[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − (1 − s)τe
∗(x) − sτ (32)
which is strictly negative since 0 <e ∗(x) < 1a n de∗(x)=1− u∗(x), ∀x ∈ [0,1]. The role of
the land rent is now to compensate remote locations for both higher commuting costs and
higher unemployment rate.
Adopting the same deﬁnition of equilibrium as in Deﬁnition 2, we obtain:
Proposition 7 At the urban land use equilibrium where social interactions ω is a function
of distance to jobs x, we obtain:
EV
∗ = e
∗(1)(y − τ)+[ 1− e
∗(1)](b − sτ)( 3 3 )
and for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
R
∗(x)=e
∗(x)[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − e
∗(1)[y − b − (1 − s)τ]+sτ (1 − x)( 3 4 )
18To illustrate the model, we perform some numerical simulations.
The period is the month. We assume a wage of w = 4 and the unemployment beneﬁti s
set to b =1 .25, so that the replacement rate is b/w =0 .31. The job destruction rate is equal
to δ =0 .01, that is, workers keep on average their job 100 months or a little bit more than
8 years. The job acquisition rate is equal to λ =0 .1. In the city, we set τ =0 .5a n ds =0 .5
(the unemployed make half as many BD-trips as the employed workers). Concerning social




w h i c hi sd e c r e a s i n ga n dc o n v e xi nx. Figures 2a-2d display the results of the simulations.
Let us interpret them. In steady-state, all workers in the city have the same utility level
given by (33) whatever their location x. However, they do not experience the same unem-
ployment rate and do not pay the same land rent. This depends on their location x in the
city. These ﬁgures show that people living closer to jobs experience a lower unemployment
rate than those living further away from jobs (Figure 2a) because they spend less time in a
d0−dyad (Figure 2b) and more time in a d1−dyad (Figure 2c). The intuition of this result is
straightforward. Individuals living closer to jobs meet more often weak ties and thus obtain
more information about jobs. As a res u l t ,t h e yd on o ts p e n dm u c ht i m ei nad0−dyad since
the only way to leave this dyad is to obtain a job through a weak tie. There are important
variations of unemployment rates following variations of the location x.F o r x = 1 (i.e.
individuals live the farthest away from the jobs), then the unemployment rate u∗ is equal to
17.74 percent while for ω close to zero (i.e. individuals live the closest to jobs), then u∗ =1 0
percent.
14Observe that because 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, this function imposes that 0.09 ≤ ω ≤ 1. This is just for simplicity.




In that case, when a is suﬃciently large, ω(x) is close to zero when x =1 .






Figure 2a: Impact of distance to jobs on unemployment








Figure 2b: Impact of distance to jobs on d0− dyads.









Figure 2c: Impact of distance to jobs on d1− dyads.
Concerning the eﬀect of location x on dyads d2, the relationship is non-monotonic (Figure
2d). Indeed, individuals close to and far away from jobs spend more time in d2−dyads than
those who live in intermediary locations because the former have a lot of contacts with weak
ties and thus obtain quickly a job while the latter have few contacts with weak ties and thus
spend most of time with strong ties, which help them to get a job only if their best friend is
employed.









Figure 2d: Impact of distance to jobs on d2− dyads.
21To summarize, when meeting weak ties involves commuting to a business center, indi-
viduals who are close to jobs obtain a lot of information about jobs, spend little time in
a d0−dyad (both friends are unemployed) and experience low unemployment rate. On the
contrary, those who live far away from jobs spend most of their time with strong ties and
thus get little information from weak ties. This means that when they belong to a d0−dyad,
where their best friend is also unemployed, they have little chance to ﬁnd a job and are stuck
in an unemployment state. This is why they experience higher unemployment rates.
6.2 Choosing social interactions
We would like now to extend the model so that ω is chosen by individuals. The timing is
as in the previous section. We assume that there is some cost of interacting with weak ties.
Let c denotes the marginal cost of these interactions. The expected utility is still given by
(17) but we need to add the interaction costs. We have:
EV(ω,x)=e
∗(ω)(y − τx)+[ 1− e
∗(ω)](b − sτx) − R(x) − cω
where e∗(ω)i sd e ﬁned by (11). Each individual optimally chooses ω that maximizes EV(ω,x).






[y − b − (1 − s)τx] − c =0
We assume that the second order condition always holds, i.e.
∂2e∗(ω)
∂ω2 < 0
Observe that y − b − (1 − s)τx>0, ∀x ∈ [0,1], and we have seen (see Proposition 4) that
if (22) holds, then
∂e∗(ω)
∂ω > 0. We have the following result:
Proposition 8 Assume (22) and consider steady-state equilibrium I. Then there exists a
unique interior ω∗ that maximizes EV(ω,x) and
(i) workers living further away from jobs will interact less with weak ties than those residing
















Workers want to interact with weak ties because it increases their probability to be
employed (or equivalently the time they spend employed during their lifetime), i.e.
∂e∗(ω)
∂ω > 0.
However, because it is always more expensive to commute to the business district when
employed than when unemployed (i.e. τ>s τ ), the marginal gain of interacting with weak
ties is higher for workers residing closer to jobs than for those locating further away. As a
result, workers residing closer to jobs will interact more with weak ties than those residing
further away from jobs. Concerning the wage y and unemployment beneﬁt b,ah i g h e ry or
b increases the value of employment and, since e∗(ω)a n dω are positively related, workers
will interact more with weak ties. The same intuition applies for commuting costs τ.
The model can be closed as in the previous section. What is interesting is that all

























As before, workers residing further away will experience higher unemployment. Also, higher
unemployment beneﬁts or commuting costs leads to higher unemployment. These results
are conformed to the intuition, even though the mechanisms are new.
7 Discussion
Because of the results of the previous section, our model can provide a mechanism explaining
why black workers, who tend to live far away from jobs in the United States, experience high
unemployment rates. This is known as the “spatial mismatch hypothesis”. Indeed, ﬁrst
formulated by Kain (1968), the spatial mismatch hypothesis states that, residing in urban
23segregated areas distant from and poorly connected to major centres of employment growth,
black workers face strong geographic barriers to ﬁnding and keeping well-paid jobs. In the
US context, where jobs have been decentralized and blacks have stayed in the central parts of
cities, the main conclusion of the spatial mismatch hypothesis is that distance to jobs is the
main cause of high unemployment rates. Since Kain’s study, hundreds of others have been
conducted trying to test the spatial mismatch hypothesis (see, in particular, the literature
surveys by Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998; Ihlanfeldt, 2006; Zenou, 2008). The usual approach
is to relate a measure of labor-market outcomes, typically employment or earnings, to another
measure of job access, typically some index that captures the distance between residences
and centres of employment. The general conclusions are: (a) poor job access indeed worsens
labor-market outcomes, (b) black and Hispanic workers have worse access to jobs than white
workers, and (c) racial diﬀerences in job access can explain between one-third and one-half
of racial diﬀerences in employment.
Despite this huge empirical literature, few theoretical models have been proposed (for a
survey on the theoretical literature, see Gobillon et al., 2007; Zenou, 2006b). The standard
approach is to use a search model to show that distant workers tend to search less (due
to lack of information about jobs or less opportunities to ﬁnd a job) and thus stay longer
unemployed (Coulson et al., 2001; Wasmer and Zenou, 2002).
In the present paper, we propose an alternative explanation. Building on Granovetter
(1973, 1974, 1983)’s idea that weak ties are superior to strong ties for providing support in
getting a job, we have developed a model in which workers who live far away from jobs tend to
have less connections to weak ties. As underscored by Granovetter, in a close network where
everyone knows each other, information is shared and so potential sources of information
are quickly shaken down so that the network quickly becomes redundant in terms of access
to new information. In contrast Granovetter stresses the strength of weak ties involving a
secondary ring of acquaintances who have contacts with networks outside ego’s network and
therefore oﬀer new sources of information on job opportunities.
Our explanation of the spatial mismatch is that distant (black) workers live in neigh-
borhoods based on closed networks, which are limited in getting information about possible
jobs. Because of the lack of good public transportation in the US, it is costly (both in terms
of time and money) to commute to business centers to meet other types of people who can
provide other source of information about jobs. If distant (black) workers mainly rely on
their strong ties and if the latter are unemployed, there is then little chance to escape un-
employment and to ﬁnd a job.15 Our result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Conley and
15Even if this is beyond the scope of this paper, our model could explain the emergence of a “black culture”
24Topa (2002). They study unemployment clustering in Chicago between 1980 and 1990 with
respect to diﬀerent social and economic distance metrics that reﬂect the structure of agents’
social networks. They show that racial and ethnic composition variables are the single most
important factor in explaining the observed correlation patterns.
O u rr e s u l ti sa l s or e l a t e dt ot h a to fC a l v ´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004). Contrary to the
present model where only a very speciﬁc network structure (i.e. the dyad) is assumed, they
explicitly model a social network (which can have any possible structure) where information
ﬂows between individuals having a link with each other. They show that there clustering
of workers with the same status is likely to emerge in equilibrium since, in the long run
(i.e. steady state), employed workers tend to be friends with employed workers. Apart
from the fact that there is no urban space, the main diﬀerence with our approach is that
individuals exchange job information only with their strong ties (as deﬁned by their direct
friends). In their model, weak ties (as deﬁned by friends of friends) will indirectly help
individuals because, by providing job information to their strong ties, they help them to
become employed. The two approaches are complementary. In Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson
(2004), if because of some initial condition some black workers are unemployed, then in
steady-state they will still be unemployed because both their strong and weak ties will
also be unemployed. In our framework, it is segregation and distance to a business center
that make black workers only interacting with strong ties, who are themselves likely to be
unemployed.16
To conclude, we believe that weak ties generate ‘bridging’ social capital. Bridging social
capital refers to ties across networks that may make the resources exist in one network
accessible to a member of another. These social relationships enable members to ‘get ahead’.
These are needed to extend beyond family to connect to a broader range of resources and
opportunities that exist in networks to which they are otherwise not connected. If black
workers do not have access to weak ties (especially whites), in particular because they are
segregated and separated from business centers, then their main source of information about
jobs will be provided by their strong ties. But if the latter are themselves unemployed, the
chance to escape unemployment will be very low.
in areas far away from jobs since distance to jobs induces the black population to rely mostly on strong ties.
16Observe that we have not explicitly modelled black and white workers. However, if, for example, we
impose housing discrimination so that blacks are obliged to live in the suburbs, then the main results of our
model will be true.
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28Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :We establish the proof in two steps. First, Lemma 1 charac-
terizes all steady-state dyad ﬂows. Lemma 2 then provides conditions for their existence.
Lemma 1 There exists at most two diﬀerent steady-state equilibria: (i) a full-unemployment
equilibrium U such that e∗ =0and u∗ =1 , (ii) an interior equilibrium I such that 0 <e ∗ < 1
and 0 <u ∗ < 1.
Proof. By combining (5) to (8), we easily obtain:
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We consider two diﬀerent cases.
(i)I fe∗ = 0, then equation (35) is satisﬁed. Furthermore, using (5) and (6), this implies
that d∗
1 = d∗
2 = 0 and, using (7) and (9), we have d∗
0 =1 /2a n du∗ =1 .T h i si sr e f e r r e dt oa s
steady-state U (full unemployment).




















− B − Z (36)















• Let us ﬁrst focus on the case where e∗ = 1. In that case, it has to be that only
d2−dyads exist and thus d∗
0 = d∗
1 = 0, which, using (37) implies that: d∗
2 =0 .S ot h i sc a s ei s
not possible.
• L e tu sn o wt h u sf o c u so nt h ec a s e :0<e ∗ < 1 (which implies that 0 <u ∗ < 1)
By plugging (36) and (37) in (7) and after some algebra, we obtain that d∗
0 solves Φ(d∗
0)=

















(i) The steady-state equilibrium U always exists.




(i) In this equilibrium e∗ = 0, which implies that h(e)=( 1− ω)λ and q(e)=0 .T h e r e
are only d0−dyads so all workers are unemployed and will never receive a job oﬀer since
q(e)=0 . S ow h e nad0−dyad is formed it is never destroyed and thus this equilibrium is
always sustainable.
(ii) We know from Lemma 1 that a steady-state I exists and that e∗ 6=1 . W en o w
have to check that e∗ > 0a n d0<d ∗
0 < 1/2. Let us thus verify whether there exists some
0 <d ∗
0 < 1/2 such that Φ(d∗
0)=0 ,w h e r eΦ(·)i sg i v e nb y( 3 8 ) .W eh a v eΦ(0) = (B/2)
2 > 0
and Φ0(0) = −(1 + Z)/2 < 0. Therefore, (38) has a unique positive root smaller than 1/2

















2 − B − Z) < 0.







0 < 1/2i f














0 < 1/2 guarantees that e∗ > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :

























































We have a quadratic function that crosses only once the positive orthant. Let us calculate
b d0 the value for which Φ(d0) crosses the d0−axis. For that, we have to solve: Φ(b d0)=0 .I t











It should be clear that if b d0 < 1/2, then Φ(d0) < 0f o r0<d 0 < 1/2a n dt h u s
∂d∗
0
∂ω < 0. Let





















































so that when δ
λ <
pω
6 (i.e. condition (22)) holds, then (10) also holds.
































































































































Since e∗ =1− u∗, ∂e∗
∂ω > 0 ⇔ ∂u∗







∂ω cannot be signed.
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